University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 24
Number 1 Summer, 1993

Article 3

1993

The Exclusion of Women from Combat: Is There a
Legal Justification?
Sandra G. Pike

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Pike, Sandra G. (1993) "The Exclusion of Women from Combat: Is There a Legal Justification?," University of Baltimore Law Forum:
Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol24/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM COMBAT:
IS THERE A LEGAL JUSTIFICATION?
Sandra G. Pike
aws preventing women from serving in military combat positions reflect the complexity of laws treating
women and men differently. Although the United
States Constitution does not require that all individuals be
treated in the same way, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause explicitly guarantees that no state can
deny any person "the equal protection of the laws.") This
principal is extended implicitly to the federal government by
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 2 The idea of
classification, treating one class of people differently from
another based upon those differences, is fundamentally
based upon inequality. Thus, courts have struggled with the
meaning of equality and application of the equal protection
concept.
In an attempt to resolve the constitutional problems
created by the deliberate categorization of social groups, the
United States Supreme Court has espoused the doctrine of
reasonable classification. This concept prohibits the government from making unreasonable classifications. 3 A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are
"similarly situated."4 Therefore, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that people who are similarly situated will be treated similarly by the federal and state govern.,.
ments. The difficulty, of course, is that women and men
differ from one another and are therefore not always "similarly situated."
Situations in which individuals are not similarly situated
are often the product of legislative and judicial creation.
Historically, legislators and judges thought it reasonable to
classify persons according to their sex. Denial of admission
to the legal profession, 5 denial of the right to vote or hold
public office, 6 and denial of the right to have women jurors 7
are only a few examples of unequal treatment of women
which were justified because of differences between women
and men.
Since the 1960s, the women's movement in America has
challenged biological determinism, the theory that attempts
to justify the subordination of women as a direct and natural
consequence of biological differences. 8 The women's movement has emphasized a legal theory of equal rights: the right
of each individual to equal treatment based on equal performance. Feminist legal scholars have challenged biological
determinism by postulating that substantial overlap exists

L

between women and men as to characteristics which are
relevant to job performance and social roles. They argue that
individuals should be free to choose careers and social roles
based on individual abilities and inclinations rather than on
the basis of stereotypical perceptions of female and male
capabilities. Although recent legislation and court decisions
have reflected the impact of the women's movement, many
laws still reflect biological determinism based on outmoded
stereotypes.
One of the most hotly debated areas involving genderbased classification concerns the role of women in the
military. Central to the resolution of this conflict is the
determination as to whether there are differences between
men and women which legally justify the exclusion ofwomen
from combat positions. Such an examination provides a
microscope through which to view equal rights application
and the question of how laws should address gender differences.
Part I of this article will examine the current law. Part n
will provide concrete experiences to illustrate ways in which
individuals are affected by the law. 9 Part III will postulate a
hypothetical constitutional challenge to the law and define
the methodology of analysis to be employed. )0 Part IV will
individually analyze the reasons most frequently espoused to
justify sustaining the current law.
It is clear from a constitutional perspective that laws and
policies which exclude women from all combat positions
violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by denying
equal treatment under the law in the areas of employment
opportunity and participation in vital acts of citizenship.
None ofthe reasons given by the military would be sufficient
for a civilian employer to legally close jobs to women. Only
one constitutionally valid reason exists for excluding women
from a limited number of combat positions. That reason is
to provide the constitutional right of privacy. However, the
current law and policies are not narrowly tailored enough to
achieve this goal with as little infringement as possible on
other constitutional rights. Therefore, if extreme deference
were not given to Congress in deciding military affairs, the
exclusion of women from all combat positions would not
pass constitutional muster. Having been granted this deference, Congress should reform the law so that the only
positions closed to women would be those for which a

constitutionally valid justification exists.

I. EXISTING LAWS AND POLICIES
No law bars women from engaging in combat, yet women
are excluded from nearly one-half of all military positions. I I
All of these exclusions are based only upon one post-World
War II era statute and upon military policy.12 The only area
of combat service from which women are excluded by law is
service on combat vessels. 13
There is no statutory restriction to the assignment of
women to combat' positions in the Air Force. 14 However,
regulations drafted by the Secretary of the Air Force exclude
women from combat positions in the Air Force, U.S. Air
Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. I 5 Similarly, there is
no law restricting the Army's assignment of women. However, the Secretary of the Army has established policies that
exclude women from combat positions. I 6
The Department of Defense does not have a directive or
regulation excluding women from combat
positions. Its general policy is to "provide
women with full and equal opportunity ... to
serve in all roles except those prohibited by
combat exclusion laws and polic[ies]. "17
The Secretary of Defense issued the Risk
Rule in 1988 to standardize positions closed
to women in the armed services. ls Thus, the
policies excluding women from combat positions are based upon this one law which
precludes women from serving on combatant ships.19

Hoist and other auxiliary ships sail the same waters and are
as likely to be fired upon as combatant ships. The difference
is that combatant ships can defend themselves. To progress
above the rank of lieutenant, her career path requires an
officer in her position to serve on a mine countermeasure ship
(MSM). MSMs are closed to women. Moreover, rescue and
salvage ships and explosive ordinance disposal ships are
being phased out to be replaced in the coming years by more
MSMs. Without change, Ensign Ritter's highly specialized
skills will be unusable. Although she has proven her ability
to perform the responsibilities ofher position, Ensign Ritter's
career progression will end because she is female.
First Lieutenant Beth Martin, an instructor pilot at Columbus Air Force Base in Mississippi, watched men who
ranked lower than her in pilot training go to fighter training
though she could not. 24 On April 28, 1993,however,Defense
Secretary Les Aspin announced the removal of restrictions
barring women from being fighter pilots. As America's first
female combat pilot, Second Lieutenant
Jeannie Flynn began training on an F-15
Strike Eagle, one ofthe most sophisticated
combat planes in the United States military arsenal on May 19, 1993.25
Captain Kristen Newman, also an instructor pilot at Columbus A.F.B. who
flew KC-135 Strato-tankers during Operation Desert Storm, said that her career
decisions were made on the premise that
she could not fly combat aircraft. 26 Jennifer Eaves, a policy analyst with the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and an ensign in the Naval Reserve,
believes that it will probably be ten to
fifteen years after women are allowed into
combat positions before women will be in
combat leadership positions?7 Lawrence
J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense under Ronald Reagan and now a senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution, said that "women have the worst of
both worlds .... They can't go into those jobs with the highest
probability ofpromotion to the top of the organization. But
they are still in danger."28

Only eleven
women hold
the rank of
general or
admiral
out of
a total of
1,021 positions
in all branches.

II. THE EFFECTS OF THE LAW
A. Discrimination in Employment Opportunities and Advancement
For women in the military, one of the
most obvious disadvantages of the combat
exclusion is the denial ofequal opportunities
for advancement. Speaking candidly to the Armed Services
Committee, General Merrill McPeak, the Air Force Chief of
Staff, conceded that a double standard exists. In his opinion,
"combat-exclusion law is discrimination against women that
... works to their disadvantage in a career context. ''20
Only eleven women hold the rank of general or admiral
out ofa total of! ,021 positions in all branches. 21 Because the
system of military promotion favors officers with combat
service, most women are excluded from the higher echelons
of military service. 22 There are many examples of women
who are blocked from promotion because of the combat
exclusion. Ensign Caren Ritter is a Naval Special Operations Officer and a diver on the U.S.S. Hoist, a rescue and
salvage ship.23 She is one of two women serving alongside
113 men. Ensign Ritter took the same training and tests as
other Navy Special Operations divers and Navy SEALS.
The training and work is physically rigorous. The U.S.S.

B. Encouragement of Sexual Harassment of Women in
the Military
An even more difficult problem than inequality in employment opportunities is a pervasive attitude in the military
that women are second class citizens and that it is therefore
acceptable to discriminate against them. Retired Marine
Colonel Dr. Paul Roush, a leadership professor at the U.S.
Naval Academy, believes that reducing sexual misconduct
will be difficult until servicewomen are no longer excluded
from combat. 29 ''Women as professionals will not be fully
legitimized until the combat exclusion is eliminated," he

said. "Its continuation perpetuates second class status and to the achievement of that purpose, this article will utilize a
expectations of substandard perfonnance for women. ''30 total of three analysis techniques. These techniques are:
The Washington Post reported that Admiral Kelso, Chief of
(1) to determine whether gender is an accurate proxy
Naval Operations, said that "the Navy may need to allow
for the characteristic or trait which the law seeks to
define;38
women to serve on all Navy warships to eradicate sexual
harassment. The absence of women on ships has contributed
(2) to determine whether the classification based
upon gender is
to a 'male culture' and results in women being treated with
less respect than male sailors. ''31
(a) underinclusive by not encompassing some
individuals within a class who have the characterisThousands of male and female sailors also perceive a
tics or traits upon which the law is based, or .
relationship linking the combat exclusion law with second
(b) overinclusive by encompassing within the
class status for women. This often results in tolerance of
sexual harassment. Many women suffer sexual harassment
class individuals who do not exhibit those characteristics or traits;39 and
silently rather than risk reprisals for reports which will
probably be ignored.32
(3) to determine whether a gender-neutral rule based
directly on that characteristic would be less effective
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
in achieving the government's goal. 40
This article poses a challenge to the law excluding women
from combat as a result of the two major negative effects of IV. BASES FOR EXCLUDING WOMEN
the law:
Providing a combat-ready military capable of defending
(1) discrimination against women in employment
our nation is the underlying important governmental purpose
opportunities; and
of the military. The same reason is espoused for excluding
(2) encouragement of sexual harassment of women
women from combat positions. 41 Without question, this is a
in the military.
legitimate, important governmental objective. 42 The military
The exclusionary law is based upon a gender classifica- has given eight reasons to explain why excluding women
tion which results in discrimination against women as a class from combat positions is substantially related to achieving
of citizens. In Craig v. Boren,33 the Supreme Court estab- that purpose. This article divides those reasons into three
lishedamid-Ievelscrutinytestfordiscriminationcasesbased classes. The first class includes perceptions about women.
on gender. To be constitutionally valid, laws involving This class encompasses the four justifications most often
gender classifications must serve "important governmental espoused by the military for the exclusion. The second class
objectives" which are "substantially related to the achieve- involves three differences between men and women which
ment of those objectives. ''34 In order to determine whether lead to the perceptions discussed in class one. The third class
the law is substantially related to the governmental objective, involves the effects of women in combat on families.
the court must evaluate whether gender is an accurate proxy
for the characteristics or traits which gender is purported to A. CLASS 1 - Perceptions: The Four Most Frequently
represent. 35
Argued Reasons for Excluding Women from Combat
The Supreme Court acknowledged the Craig test as the
Arguments given by the military in recent polls for excludrelevant inquiry in gender classification cases in Rostker v. ing women from combat were that American forces would
Goldberg. 36 However, the Court decided Rostker on the appear more vulnerable to enemy forces which are comprised
basis of extreme deference to Congress rather than upon the solely of men, that men would feel compelled to protect
application of the Craig test, thereby setting a precedent in women soldiers, and that both men and women would suffer
support of such deference to Congress in military matters. a loss of privacy.43 A fourth argument, given by the
As a result, changes in the law excluding women from Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in
combat would likely come from the legislature rather than the the Anned Forces is that a negative impact on unit cohesion
courts. Ultimately, the goal of both the legislature and the would result. 44
judiciary is to effectuate laws which are based upon the
Perception of Greater Vulnerability to All-Male EnConstitution. Therefore, the Craig test serves as the founda- emy Forces. One of the most frequently espoused reasons
tion for this constitutional analysis of the law excluding for excluding women from combat positions is that American
women from serving in combat positions.
forces would be perceived as more vulnerable to all-male
The constitutional analysis suggested here differs from enemy forces. 45 Thus, an underlying governmental purpose
that of Craig because it expands the analysis in two ways. of the law is to avoid a perception of vulnerability by enemy
First, in considering the important governmental purpose, forces. For the purposes of discussion, this underlying
this article will also consider underlying purposes implied by purpose will be accepted as a subcategory of the important
the reasons articulated for excluding women from combat. 37 governmental purpose of providing for the national defense.
There is weak congruence between a gender classification
Second, in considering the substantial relationship ofthe law

law and the achievement ofthis purpose because gender is an
inaccurate proxy for competency. Failure makes the armed
forces look more vulnerable just as success makes them look
less vulnerable. The military did not appear vulnerable to the
enemy in Operation Desert Storm even though the forces
included more than 35,000 women. 46 A gender-neutral rule
based upon measuring competence and placement of only
those competent to perform the needed tasks would be more
effective in achieving the government's purpose. Therefore,
the law excluding women from combat positions is not
substantially related to achieving the goal of appearing less
vulnerable to the enemy.
Compulsion to Protect Women. The perception that
men in combat positions would feel compelled to protect
women is another reason frequently argued-for excluding
women from combat positions. 47 Even though he felt the lack
ofcombat experience was detrimental to career advancement
for women, General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of
Staff, articulated reservations about sending women into
combat as follows:
I still think it is not a good idea for me to have to order
women into combat. Combat is about killing people
... [E]ven though logic tells us that women can do
that as well as men, I have a very traditional attitude
about wives and mothers and daughters being ordered to kill people. 48
The underlying purpose of the law excluding women from
combat positions reflected in this reason could be either to protect those
who need protection or to respond to
men's feelings about women. Responding to men's feelings about
women has been determined not to
constitute an important governmental
purpose. 49
For purposes of discussion, an underlying goal of protecting those in
need of protection will be accepted as
ancillary to the overriding purpose of
providing for the national defense.
However, gender is an inaccurate
proxy for the need to be protected.
Thirteen women were killed and two taken prisoner in
Operation Desert Storm while serving in non-combat positions. 50 The law excluding women from combat did not and
could not accomplish the goal of protecting all of those who
need protection. Thus, gender classification is underinclusive
because non-combat positions are not included. The law is
additionally underinclusive because some men need more
protection than some women. Men have taken extraordinary
risks to protect other men in combat, and they have frequently
received medals of honor for doing so. Moreover, the law is
overinclusive because not all women need to be protected.
Thus, gender does not distinguish those who need protection

from those who do not.
A gender-neutral rule requiring each person, male or
female, to be tested and qualified for the position to which
they are assigned and rules providing protection to those
requiring it, regardless of their sex, would be more effective
in achieving the government's purpose of protecting those
who need it. Therefore, the law excluding women from
combat positions is not substantially related to achieving the
purpose of providing protection for those in need of protection.
Moreover, classification, based on gender, into protectors and protected groups is ineffective and overinclusive.
Not all males are protectors offemales as is evidenced by the
problems of sexual harassment and rape of servicewomen by
servicemen. 51 "[R]ampant sexual violence" is referred to as
"[t ]he military' s best-kept secret" by Representative Patricia
Schroeder (D-CO.).52 Sexual harassment is a major concern
in the loss of privacy argument favoring the exclusion law.
Loss of Privacy for Both Men and Women. Thethird
most frequently articulated reason for excluding women
from combat positions is the loss of privacy for both males
and females. Privacy in this context includes both providing
general privacy by avoiding visual contact to curb sexual
attractions and preventing rape and sexual harassment. 53
Preventing a forced loss of general privacy has been
determined to be an important governmental purpose. 54
Realistically, it may be impossible to provide privacy in some
combat positions. If such positions
are not voluntary for both males and
females and if full disclosure and acceptance of the lack of privacy is not
obtained, the government would be
liable for a violation of a person's
constitutional right to privacy. In Bell
v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held
that, to the extent necessary to achieve
a legitimate goal, some privacy rights
may be restricted. 55 However, the
Court continued that there was a duty
to ascertain that such restrictions represent reasonable means of achieving
these goals. 56 Gender classification is
not totally irrational for this purpose, and gender separation
represents an accurate proxy for privacy in this situation.
The law, however, is overinclusive. Positions from which
women are excluded include positions where as much privacy can be offered as is available in non-combat positions.
It has been proven by Navy experience that gender-integrated
ships perform as well as those with all male crews. 57 Closer
living and working relationships are required by shipboard
life than by aircraft squadrons, yet women are banned from
air combat positions. 58 Gender-neutral policies which provide more privacy for both males and females would be more
substantially related to achieving the goal of providing more

... changes in the law
excluding womenfrom
combat would likely
come from the
legislature rather than
the courts.

privacy in the majority of combat positions.
While there may be a small number of positions, such as
ground combat, for which there are no gender-neutral solutions, there is no justification for excluding women from all
positions. Privacy in this context also refers to preventing
rape and sexual harassment. The prevention of rape and
sexual harassment has been held to be important governmental purposes. 59 Gender, however, is not an accurate proxy for
discipline. Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Co.) is
outraged that Congress would suggest that eliminating the
presence of women is a solution to the problems of rape and
sexual harassment. 60 Removing the victims of crime is not a
reasonable solution to combating crime. The result is to
punish the victim rather than the perpetrator.
Leadership, commitment to change, and uncompromising punishment of violators were identified as the keys to
overcoming the problems of drug abuse and racial discrimination in the armed forces. 61 These are also gender-neutral
solutions to overcoming the problems of sexual harassment
and rape. According to Dr. Paul Roush, "sexual harassment
... is not primarily about sex - it is about power. Harassment
is an attempt by members of the charter group to tell those
seeking membership in the group that they do not belong. Its
intent is to ensure that individuals in the membership-seeking
group are kept vulnerable. "62 Thus, laws and policies which
do not tolerate rape and sexual harassment, rather than those
which eliminate the presence of women, would be a more
effective means of achieving the governmental purpose of
preventing rape and sexual harassment.
Negative Impact on Unit Cohesion. A fourth reason
frequently espoused by the military for excluding women
from combat positions is that there would be a resultant
negative impact on unit cohesion. 63 Unit cohesion has been
defined as the power of a group to act as a single unit in
pursuit of a common objective. 64 For purposes of this
discussion, it will be assumed that unit cohesion contributes
to the overriding goal of military readiness to provide for the
national defense and is, therefore, an important governmental purpose.
Gender is an inaccurate proxy for the ability to bond. In
an analogous situation, race was used as a proxy for leadership and the ability to bond. Integration ofAfrican-American
men into the military was resisted by the military leaders.
Some felt that leadership was not "imbedded in the negro
race. "65 There was great concern that "white [men would]
not accept a negro in a position of authority over him."66
African-Americans, however, were able to prove that race
was not a valid indicator of leadership ability.67
In the same way, the integration of women into the
military was resisted. 68 One critic remarked that enrolling
women into the Naval Academy was "poisoning the preparation ofmen."69 According to General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, the male bonding issue
goes to the heart of the combat exclusion. 70

Kenneth Karst suggests that
Historically ... the academies and a few other areas
of the military-Marine Corps boot camp, airborne
training - have provided a ritualistic rite of passage
into manhood. It was one small area of our society
that was totally male. Women now have a full range
of choice, from the totally female - motherhood - to
the totally male - the academies, for example. Males
in the society feel stripped, symbolically .... 71
Many men resist initial integration because they find it
threatening to their manhood. However, relying upon an
ideology of manhood which subordinates women to justify
excluding women from any form of government service is
unconvincing and unjust.
Gender-neutral rules would be more effective in achieving the governmental purpose of fostering positive unit
cohesion. Martin Binkin, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institute, believes that "[w]omen will continue to have
problems in the military so long as they are a distinct
minority."72 As women become more commonplace in
combat roles, men will learn to relate to them as part of the
team rather than as an unwelcome minority. Men have grown
accustomed to working alongside women in non-combat
military life and in male bastions of civilian life such as in
police departments, in fire departments, on construction
sites, and in the courts.
The feeling of inclusion and of being a part of a team is
a key element in unit cohesion. Women and men train and
serve together. They are asked to become a team. Yet both
know that when their unit is called into combat, the unit will
split. Without regard to similarities or superiorities in skill,
knowledge, or competence, the men will go into combat and
the women will not. Rather than fostering unit cohesion, the
law excluding women from combat inhibits such cohesion.
Therefore, the law excluding women from combat positions
is not substantially related to achieving this purpose.
Confidence in the competence and ability of other team
members to rescue a wounded member of a unit also contributes to unit cohesion. These concerns relate to the second
class - differences between men and women.

B. CLASS 2 - Differences between Women and Men
Surprisingly, physical differences, pregnancy, and psychological differences are espoused as reasons for excluding
women from combat less frequently than the reasons previously discussed. 73 However, these differences, real and
imagined, underlie the perceptions about women and the
effects of allowing women into combat positions.
Physical Differences. Many argue that, because women
are generally physically weaker than men, women in combat
would weaken the military. Author Brian Mitchell claims
that the rigorous physical standards of the military would
have to be lowered for women to qualify for combat units,
resulting in a weaker military. 74 John Luddy, a Marine Corps
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Reserve Infantry officer and defense analyst at the Heritage
Foundation, contends that "[t]he military is not a jobs
program. nor is it an equal opportunity program .... Putting
women in combat will weaken the fighting ability that is the
key to winning battles and wars. It is not worth a single life
to provide equal opportunity. "75
Assuring that service personnel have the physical capability to competently perfonn their jobs is, therefore, an
implied purpose underlying this reason for excluding women
from combat positions. Assuring the physical capacity to
competently perfonn is part of military readiness and thus an
important governmental purpose.
Substantial evidence supports the view that more men
than women would qualify for certain physically strenuous
positions. Women rarely have the physical strength of men.
Men are generally taller, heavier, and more muscular than
women. 76 Female dynamic upper torso
muscular strength is approximately fifty
to sixty percent that ofmales. 77 Female
aerobic capacity is approximately seventy to seventy-five percent that of males,
requiring the average female to work at a
higher percentage of her aerobic capacity
and making her more susceptible to fatigue than the average male. 78 Women are
also at greater risk of exercise-induced
injuries than men. 79 Therefore, as compared to men, women are generally at a
disadvantage when performing tasks re.quiring high levels of muscular strength
and aerobic capacity.
This disparity in strength is not trivial
in a statistical sense, yet it can hardly fonn
the basis for use of gender lines as a
classifying device. Gender is being employed as an inaccurate proxy for physical competence tests. Some military personnel dismiss
arguments based on physical strength as irrelevant. According to Newton N. Minnow, "[i]n today's technological
fighting, with laser guided bombs, heatseeking missiles,
Tomahawks, satellites, AWACS, Hellfires, SLAMS, and
Patriots, the traditional military definition of 'combat' is
hopelessly artificial and obsolete."80 Air Force General
Jeanne Holm agrees that "intellect has replaced brawn" as
warfare has become more technological in nature. 81
The lines distinguishing combat and combat support
positions are blurred. During Operation Desert Stonn,
women were allowed to fly Air Force refueling planes,
officially a "combat-support" position. Yet some observers
say this is more dangerous than flying a bomber, which is a
"combat" position. 82 Lieutenant General Thomas Hickey,
Deputy Chief of Staff for personnel of the Air Force, told the
House Anned Services Committee that "the one thing I am
sure of is there is probably not a combat job in the United

States Air Force that women cannot do. ''83 According to the
National Women's Law Center, "[w]omen now train men to
fly combat aircraft, serve as test pilots for combat planes, and
experience the stress of flying into enemy territory in slower,
more vulnerable aircraft. ''84
In ground combat, a woman would need the ability to
throw a grenade beyond the bursting radius and the ability to
rescue a wounded soldier. However, many of the combat
positions traditionally closed to women, such as flying F -16
fighters85 and commanding aircraft carriers, require less
physical strength than positions now held by women in noncombat positions. 86 In fact, because of the inverse relationship between height and G-tolerance,87 women pilots enjoy
physiological advantages over men. 88 Thus, a law which
excludes women from all combat positions is overinclusive
because some combat positions do not require physical
strength. It is probably true that in handto-hand combat a few more people would
be lost because women are not as strong,
admitted Dr. Roush. "However on balance, fewer lives would be lost for all
combat. ''89 Hand-to-hand combat is extremely rare. In most situations other
skills are more important than strength~
Dr. Roush points out that "people do not
die because they cannot do pull ups.''90
The law is also underinclusive because some differences, though more common to one gender, are not gender-specific. Representative Schroeder stated in
a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Military Personnel and Compensation
that "[s lome women can indeed carry as
much weight, throw as far, and run as fast
as some men, and some women exceed
some men in physical strength and endurance. ''91 American women are slightly larger than the
Vietcong and North Vietnamese men that the U.S. forces
opposed in the Vietnam War. Dr. Roush suggests that had
the U.S. been able to "settle that conflict with a weight lifting
contest the outcome might have been very different. ''92
Gender-neutral regulations which require tests ofphysical ability related to requirements of that position would
constitute a more effective means of achieving the
government's purpose of assuring the physical capacity of
military personnel to skillfully perfonn in combat. Brigadier
General Evelyn Foote offers a reasonable resolution - ''Never
compromise standards. Be sure that anybody in any MOS
[Military Occupational Specialty] can do everything required in that MOS.''93
Another consideration related to strength is the way in
which the equipment which is used haS been designed. "For
most military equipment, we find out how strong the average
man is and then write specifications to that standard. As new
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equipment is contemplated the initial design phase could,
instead, incorporate the strength of the average woman ....
The equipment would be easier for everybody to operate,"
concluded Dr. Roush. 94 Some may argue that the increased
costs are not worth the few women who would qualify.
However, fitness tests are already required so the costs of
matching skills with the MOS would be minor. New
equipment is constantly being designed and implemented.
Therefore, incorporating the strength of the average woman
into the design phase would not substantially increase cost.
In addition, cost has been held as an invalid justification for
discrimination. 95
Therefore, the law excluding women from combat positions is not substantially related to assuring that service
personnel in combat positions have the physical capability
and competence to perform the requirements of the position.
Pregnancy. Another physical difference between men
and women which is used to justify the exclusion of women
from combat positions is that women can become pregnant.
Opponents of women in combat argue that, because pregnancy is gender specific, women are not "similarly situated"
for equal protection purposes on the issue of combat. Pregnancy results in lost time and diminished
troop readiness. The germane concerns,
therefore, are lost time and troop readiness
rather than pregnancy.
Gender is an accurate proxy for pregnancy but not an accurate proxy for lost
time. Lost time includes pregnancy, hospitalization, confinement, desertion, and other
unauthorized absences.
Gender classification is underinclusive
because males also contribute to time loss
which effects combat readiness. Men have
quadruple the losttime rate ofwomen during
their first enlistment. 96 Dr. Roush points out
that true lost time should include time taken
from productive work by the infrastructure
as a result of disciplinary problems. 97 That
infrastructure includes psychologists, substance abuse counselors, chaplains, trial lawyers, legal clerks,
Judge Advocate General reviewers, commanding officers,
witnesses, operators of the brigades and stockades, and
medical personnel. 98 He speculates that the true lost time rate
of men is probably ten times that of women. 99 Moreover, the
law banning all women from combat positions because of
lost time due to pregnancy is overinclusive because not all
women will become pregnant.
Gender-neutral rules relating to lost time would be more
effective in achieving the government's purpose of reducing
lost time and thereby increasing military readiness. Therefore, the law excluding women from combat is not substantially related to achieving the asserted governmental purpose.

Psychological Differences. Another argument used to
justify the exclusion ofwomen from combat is that women do
not have the psychological makeup to win in combat. Neither
the intellectual capabilities nor the leadership abilities of
women has been questioned. Women have proven themselves capable in these areas in non-combat positions. The
argument centers on whether women will have the aggressiveness required to go into combat and kill. This reason
suggests an underlying purpose ofproviding and maintaining
mentally and psychologically fit military personnel. The
nexus between providing for the national defense and this
underlying reason is sufficient to accept it as an important
governmental purpose.
However, there is weak congruence between gender and
the characteristic of aggressiveness which gender is purported to represent. Phyllis ScWafly, a writer for the
Heritage Foundation, fears that after expensive training in
peace time, many women would purposefully get pregnant to
avoid service during a battle.lOo Dr. Roush suggests that
many are comparing actual women to ideal men. 101 It is
estimated that during World War II, only fifteen percent of
the infantry soldiers fired their weapons during action with
the enemy.l02 During the Vietnam War,
thousands of men avoided the draft, even if
it required fleeing the country to do SO.103
Some men and women would undoubtedly
avoid combat. Although specific methods of
avoiding combat may be gender specific, the
problem of individuals avoiding combat is
not. In fact, Navy data shows that academy
women stay in the Navy longer following
graduation than their male counterparts. I04
Thus, the law excluding women from combat is underinclusive in that men as well as
women may avoid combat. It is also
overinclusive because not all women would
avoid combat.
Can women behave aggressively to find
and kill the enemy? Views about women's
aggressiveness differ greatly. General Robert Barrow believes that "the very nature ofwomen disqualifies them for doing it. Women give life, sustain life, nurture
life, they do not take it."105 Dr. Roush believes that a
woman's aggressiveness, like a man's, depends upon what is
socially acceptable to the place and time. "There are places
that women do things that would put to lie the notion that
women cannot do harsh things," he opines. "In this country
- without discussing this in terms ofwhether it is right, wrong,
or anything else- [look at] abortion. Like fun they can't take
life - they take it 1.6 million times a year in this country.
Women can kill."I06 It is true that there are more violent
crimes perpetrated by males than females. Prison populations attest to this. Misdirected aggression, however, is not
conducive to success in combat.

Constitutionally,
classification
by gender is an
zmproper
criteria
for all but
a limited number
ofpositions.

The mental and psychological factors which create good
leaders and followers and which allow service personnel to
succeed in combat are not gender specific. From his experience as a prisoner ofwar, Admiral James Stockdale said that
the ''true heroes are not those who blaze along in a moment
of superb performance, but those who endure interminably
when there is no light at the end of the tunnel."l 07
Gender classification is overinclusive in that women who
are ready, willing, and able to fight and lead are excluded
from doing so. In addition, gender classification is
underinclusive because men who are not ready, willing, and
able emotionally or psychologically are not included.
Gender-neutral rules of training and testing would be
more effective in providing emotionally and psychologically
fit military personnel. Thus, the law excluding women from
combat is not substantially related to the purpose of providing psychologically capable combat troops.

C. CLASS 3 - The Effects on Families
Another reason articulated for maintaining the law excluding women from combat positions is the effect on
families, particularly children. los This concern, associated
with mothers in the military, generally becomes more acute
with longer deployments and the danger associated with
combat positions.
The implied goal suggested by this reason is to protect and
provide for the welfare of children. Jeannie Ralston, author
of Women's Work, opined that "[o]nlywimps whine about
mothers of young children going into a war zone."I09 The
Gulf War left children from 17,500 families without their
custodial parents. IIO Jean Bethke Elshtain questioned how
anyone could consider this a feminist victory .111
Gender is an accurate proxy for motherhood. Statistical
evidence does support the view that more women than men
are the primary caregivers of children. However, excluding
all women is an overinclusive classification because not all
women are mothers. Moreover, excluding only women is an
underinclusive classification because fathers who are the
primary or only caregiver are not included.
A gender-neutral means of providing exceptions from
combat positions for primary caretakers of children would
more effectively achieve the goal ofproviding for the welfare
of children by protecting their primary caregiver. I12 Therefore, the law excluding women from combat is not substantially related to achieving the goal of providing for the
welfare of children.
The possibility of compulsory military service complicates this issue. Allowing all women to voluntarily choose
combat positions, while not allowing the same choice for
males, is often suggested as a possible solution. This solution
resolves only the problem of unequal employment opportunities. Class discrimination, unequal treatment, problems of
resentment, and attitudes of second class status which result
as a by-product of unequal treatment would not be resolved.

Legislation which would force mothers to leave their children
to serve in the military would be an unacceptable and drastic
change to most of society.
Gender-neutral rules allowing exemptions for primary
caregivers from selective service or the continuation ofthe all
volunteer military would ~ore efficiently achieve the goal of
providing for the welfare of children. The fear that the draft
may be reinstituted and that exemptions would not be available may be the greatest societal barrier to change ofthis law.
CONCLUSION
Women have the physical and psychological ability to
perform well in combat. The reasons articulated for excluding women from combat positions would not be sufficient
justifications for a civilian employer to legally close jobs to
women so they should not be sufficient justifications for the
military to close jobs to them. Simply being male is not a
bona fide occupational qualification.
Constitutionally, classification by gender is an improper
criteria for all but a limited number of positions. The only
constitutionally valid reason existing for the exclusion of
women from combat is to provide the constitutional right of
privacy. Other more narrowly tailored solutions can and
should be utilized to achieve the goal of privacy in all
situations where other alternatives exist. Classification by
qualification would be more effective criteria for determining
who should serve in almost all combat positions.
The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to overturn the
law and policies or to require a narrowing of the broad
exclusion because of deference to Congress in decisions
involving military affairs. Questions about the meaning and
application of equal rights to gender issues are not the
monopoly ofthe courts. These issues are continually debated
in all branches of government and in society at large.
Progress may come through military establishment
changes in policy as is evidenced by the overturning of the
regulation barring women from flying fighter planes in
combat. Even if this step was taken only to appease the
public outrage over the sexual harassment of women that has
traditionally been accepted in the military, it represents a
major step toward achieving equality in the military. However, more progress is required. The legislature, rather than
the courts, and each military branch will most likely decide
the ultimate issue ofwomen's roles in combat because of the
broad implications as to the role of women in society at large.
Legal debate on the meaning and application of equal
rights has a significant influence on legislative and social
reform in all areas of equality. It is possible for the courts or
the legislature to balance societal needs, constitutional rights
of privacy, equality, and national defense. Reformation of
the law and policies which currently exclude women from all
combat positions is a vital step in that process.
Women represent one-half of the brain power, leadership
ability, and physical strength of our nation. Removing
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